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Symposium]

Introduction: The Shifting Sands of Public
Corruption
Arlo Devlin-Brown* and Stephen Dee**
This Issue of the Penn State Law Review addresses a very special
project, the Law Review's first symposium on public corruption.' It is a
particularly apt moment for a symposium such as this. For one thing, the
law of corruption is in a state of flux following the Supreme Court's
2016 decision in McDonnell v. United States.2 For another, issues
relating to public corruption are front of mind in the public
consciousness. The 2016 presidential election helped bring corruption
issues to the fore of public discourse, with partisans on both sides
pointing to alleged conflicts of interest and public corruption concerns.
And while particular causes may divide the public along partisan lines,
there is a widespread belief that conflicts of interest and even outright

* Arlo Devlin-Brown is a partner in the White Collar Defense and Investigations Practice
Group at Covington & Burling LLP. He previously served in the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of New York, most recently as Chief of its Public Corruption
Unit.
** Stephen Dee is an associate in the White Collar Defense and Investigations Practice
Group at Covington & Burling LLP.
1. Symposium, Breach of the Public (Dis)Trust: Political Corruption and
Government Ethics in 2017, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 979-1070 (2017).
2. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
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corruption are present in our organs of government,3 and a similarly
widespread desire to "clean up" government.4
If there is consensus that public corruption must be addressed, the
question becomes how best to do so. How far should criminal law reach
to ensure that even the most creative variants of bribery are covered
while "politics as usual"-warts and all-is not criminalized? What new
laws should be proposed, or new regulations enacted? How, in sum, can
public corruption best be addressed at this point given the legal and
political landscapes? These are the questions the Symposium seeks to
address, in multi-disciplinary fashion.
The Symposium brings together academics, good-government
advocates, and practitioners with experience representing both the
prosecution and the defense, to opine on the state of public corruption
prosecutions in the United States. It is an opportunity to share insight,
expertise, and experience from lawyers, reformists, and academics alike,
providing a richer and more comprehensive understanding for both the
audience and the contributors themselves. The Penn State Law Review
and the sponsors of this Symposium have provided an ideal platform to
look meaningfully at the legal framework that has developed in this field
and to examine the real-world ramifications of practice and reform at
every level of government.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
McDONNELL

Looming large over the Symposium is the Supreme Court's
decision last term in McDonnell v. United States. The McDonnell case is
addressed by nearly every contributor to the Symposium, and some
understanding of the case is crucial for the reader. It is therefore useful
to provide a brief synopsis of the case and the Supreme Court's decision
as a foundation.
In 2014, Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell was indicted under
several federal criminal corruption statutes for accepting gifts and loans
3.

See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST:

THEIR GOVERNMENT

How AMERICANS VIEW

72-82 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/11/11-23-

2015-Govemance-release.pdf; 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption,
GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-governmentcorruption.aspx.
4. See, e.g., Memorandum from Geoff Garin, Hart Research Assoc., Survey of
Voters in 2018 Senate Battleground States 2-3 (Jan. 3, 2017), https://cdn.americanpro
gress.org/content/uploads/2017/01/03093550/ME-CAP-Senate-BG-Key-Findings.pdf;
QUINNIPIAC UNIV., CORRUPTION IS VERY SERIOUS AND ALBANY WON'T FIx IT, NEW YORK
STATE VOTERS TELL QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL; EFFORT TO BOOST ECONOMY WILL
FAIL, UPSTATE VOTERS SAY 1 (2016), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/ny/ny07202

016_Nyg32rt.pdf.
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totaling more than $175,000 from a Virginia businessman in exchange
for "performing official actions . . . to legitimize, promote, and obtain

research studies" for the businessman's nutritional supplements.s
Prosecutors alleged that McDonnell and his wife accepted various gifts
from the businessman, ranging from $20,000 in designer clothing to
$15,000 to help pay for their daughter's wedding, as well as multiple
loans to alleviate the couple's "financial problems." 6 In exchange,
McDonnell allegedly arranged meetings for the businessman with
Virginia officials, hosted events for his nutritional supplement business
at the Governor's Mansion, and contacted other government officials
about research studies of the supplement.' McDonnell was convicted by
jury of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion-both of which
cover quid pro quo bribery schemes-and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted review and vacated McDonnell's
conviction, holding that an overbroad definition of "official act" was
provided to the jury. "Official act," an element of the honest services
fraud and Hobbs Act extortion offenses brought against McDonnell, was
defined (by agreement of the parties) as it appears in a different federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3): "any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at
any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public
official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of
trust or profit." 9 The trial court instructed the jury, over the objection of
the defense, that "official actions" included "actions that have been
clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official's
position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities
explicitly assigned by law," and "may include acts that a public official
customarily performs" "in furtherance of longer-term goals" or "in a
series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end." 10 Accordingly,
the trial court's instruction permitted in theory the jury to convict even if
it concluded that Governor McDonnell had provided official access and
facilitated official meetings but had never intended or agreed to influence
the outcome of any governmental decision in support of the
businessman's interests.
The Supreme Court held that this broad definition of an "official
act" was erroneous and would have permitted the jury to convict
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.
Id. at 2362-64.
Id. at 2361.
Id. at 2367.
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012).
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
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Governor McDonnell for political conduct that, disagreeable or not, was
not criminal." In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court found
first that arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an
event-without more-was not a "question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy," which the parties had agreed was required. 12
The Court interpreted "question" and "matter" narrowly to refer only to
more formal exercises of power, as in lawsuits, hearings, or
proceedings.13 The Court then considered whether arranging a meeting,
contacting another official, or hosting an event qualified as the "decision
or action" taken on a different, suitable "question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy." The Court found that it did not; the law
required something more, like exerting pressure on another public
official to perform an "official act," or advising another public official
while knowing or intending that this would spur an "official act" by that
official. 14 The Court asserted that "conscientious public officials"
arrange for meetings or events "all the time," and cited amici, 5 including
White House counsel for a string of past presidents, who argued that an
expansive interpretation of "official act" could "chill" interaction
between representatives and their constituents.16 The Court also pointed
to due process, vagueness, and federalism concerns.17 Because the
instructions provided to McDonnell's jury did not include language
correctly qualifying the expanse of "official act," the Court held that the
jury "may have convicted Governor McDonnell for conduct that is not
unlawful."1 The Court vacated the conviction.1 9
The McDonnell ruling made waves, not only as a reversal of a highprofile conviction, 2 0 but as a potential inflection point in public
11. See id. at 2373-75.
12. Id. at 2368-69.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2372.
15. Id. (citing Brief of Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), 2016 WL
878849, at *6; Amicus Brief of Former Virginia Attorneys General in Support of
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), 2016 WL
878861, at *1-2, *16; Amici Curiae Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys General (NonVirginia) Supporting Petitioner Robert F. McDonnell, McDonnell v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 909266, at *1-2).
16. Id. (quoting Brief of Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiaein Support of
Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), 2016 WL
878849, at *6).
17. Id. at 2373.
18. Id at 2375.
19. Id.
20. The Department of Justice elected not to retry McDonnell, and the case was
dismissed. See Order, United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-cr-00012 (E.D. Va. Sept.
23, 2016).
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corruption jurisprudence. But the true significance and impact of that
change is open to debate. It is indisputable, of course, that McDonnell
changed the legal landscape: a public official could no longer be
convicted under the existing federal criminal statutes for accepting a
bribe in return only for official access as opposed to influencing an actual
governmental decision. But how much more difficult will it now be to
obtain a conviction of a public official? Will prosecutors be deterred
from bringing certain cases, and should they be so deterred? Will
McDonnell provide new ammunition to defense counsel in public
corruption trials?
Will the holding inspire new challengesconstitutional or otherwise-to other public corruption laws? And most
fundamentally, did McDonnell appropriately reign in the reach of the
federal corruption laws, and, in the post-McDonnell universe, what are
the pathways to and prospects of governmental reform? These are not
easy questions, and the commentators here have reached varying
conclusions as they seek to understand and explain where the law and
policy issues underlying public corruption now stand.
II.

THE SYMPOSIUM'S CONTRIBUTORS

In this Symposium, we will hear from a wide range of contributors,
including legal scholars, government reformers, and practitioners from
both the prosecution and defense. Together they will examine not only
McDonnell but also the future of public corruption law enforcement and
law reform as a whole.
From the world of academia, Professor George Brown of Boston
College Law School and Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington
University School of Law offer distinct perspectives. Professor Brown
addresses how McDonnell responded to those-some of whom filed
amici briefs in the case-who criticize the criminalization of what they
believe to be ordinary practice between constituents and officials that is
essential to any functioning representative government.2
Professor
Brown argues that McDonnell can't be read as more than a partial victory
for those critics if construed strictly as a statutory interpretation case, but
considers whether other aspects of the opinion, such as the Supreme
Court's discussion of constitutional concerns, could indicate broader
significance for the case.22 Meanwhile, Professor Clark discusses how
the McDonnell decision fits with what she describes as an on-going trend
in the judiciary to distort anticorruption laws with unduly narrow

21.

See generally George D. Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption Enterprise After

McDonnell - Lessons from the Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 989 (2017).
22. Id. at 998-1004.
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interpretations.23 These narrow readings may serve some purpose in the
campaign context, Professor Clark argues, by permitting practices that,
while troubling, may be a necessary evil of fundraising, but McDonnell
takes it a step further by applying a narrow reading to outright gift
giving, which does not serve any legitimate policy purpose.24
From the government reform community, the Symposium provides
contributions from two authors from Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington ("CREW"), a nonprofit organization dedicated to
reducing the influence of money in politics and increasing accountability
for violators of campaign finance, ethics, or tax rules.25 Stuart McPhail,
who serves as Litigation Counsel, examines how transparency (e.g.,
disclosure) serves as one of the Supreme Court's core answers to
concerns about corruption.26 To the extent that McDonnell narrows the
reach of criminal corruption laws, transparency will become arguably
even more important. However, McPhail contends, corporations are
attempting to use First Amendment freedom of speech and assembly
precedent dating back to the Civil Rights Movement to avoid campaign
finance disclosures.2 7 Jennifer Ahearn, Policy Counsel for CREW,
examines the statute at the center of McDonnell-the federal bribery
statute 2 8-and offers potential fixes to "plug the hole" identified by the
Court's holding.29 Ahearn navigates the constitutional complications and
draws from other current federal legislation and regulations to identify
potential paths forward.30
And finally, from the cadre of practitioners in this field, we have
two contributors who share with the Symposium (in presentations that
are not presented in written form in the Law Review) their experiences
both as prosecutor and as defense counsel in high profile public
corruption trials. Arlo Devlin-Brown, a partner at Covington & Burling
LLP and one of the co-authors of this Introduction, addresses the recent
prosecutions of former New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon
Silver and former New York State Senate majority leader Dean Skelos,
23. Kathleen Clark, Professor, Wash. Univ. School of Law, Narrowing and
Distorting Our Anticorruption Laws at the Penn State Law Review Symposium: Breach
of the Public (Dis)Trust: Political Corruption and Government Ethics in 2017 (Mar. 17,
2017).
24. Id.
AND
ETHICS
IN
WASH.,
Us,
CITIZENS
FOR
RESP.
25. About
http://www.citizensforethics.org/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
26. See generally Stuart McPhail, Publius, Inc.: Corporate Abuse of Privacy
Protectionsfor Electoral Speech, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 1049 (2017).
27. See generally id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
29. See generally Jennifer Ahearn, A Way Forwardfor Congress on Bribery After
McDonnell, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 1013 (2017).
30. See id. at 1019-24.
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which he supervised in his role at the time as Chief of the Public
Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York. From the perspective of an accomplished defense lawyer,
John Brownlee, a partner at Holland & Knight LLP, provides a first-hand
account of the McDonnell trial. Brownlee served as trial counsel for
Governor McDonnell and sheds light on the case from the defense's
perspective.
III. CLOSING THOUGHTS FROM THE CO-AUTHORS
Having set the stage and previewed the work of the Symposium's
contributors, we offer some of our own thoughts on what McDonnell
means for the future of public corruption prosecutions and defenses.
While some commentators have feared (and others hoped) that
McDonnell would sharply alter the ability of prosecutors to bring most
public corruption cases, that is unlikely to be the reality. In fact, the
impact of McDonnell has been very limited to date. Obviously it has
impacted those prosecutions with trials that took place before the
decision came down and where appeals have not yet been exhausted. In
those cases, the courts will have to examine the evidence and jury
instructions, both to determine whether the instructions would have
permitted the jury. in theory to convict for something less than an
"official act," and whether any such instructional error was likely
dispositive to the outcome.3 1 But this impact is limited to a defined set of
cases over a particular period of time. By and large, prosecutors have
continued to bring aggressive public corruption cases. Prosecutors have
brought corruption cases just in recent months against a former top aide
to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo; 32 a former mayor of Palm
Springs, California; 33 a Michigan town trustee; 34 a New York county
executive;35 and a New York town supervisor 96-just to name a few.
So why has McDonnell not deterred prosecutors from bringing
cases? The reality is that McDonnell only precludes prosecutions where
the government's theory is that the public official agreed to provide
31. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 660 Fed. App'x. 4, 7 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016);
United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Fattah, No.
15-346, 2016 WL 7839022, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2016) (appeal filed); United States
v. Bills, No. 1:14-cr-00135, 2016 WL 4528075, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016).
32. Complaint, United States v. Percoco, No. 1:16-mj-06005-UA (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2016).
33. Felony Complaint, People v. Pougnet, No. RIF1700618 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 16,
2017).
34. Complaint, United States v. Reynolds, No. 16-20732 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2016).
35. Indictment, United States v. Mangano, No.16-cr-540(SJF) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2016).
36. Id.
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preferential access rather than an actual exercise of governmental power.
However, prosecutors do not usually bring cases alleging that mere
official access was the only goal of the corrupt scheme. Instead,
prosecutors allege that the corrupt scheme involved at least the intended
exercise of governmental power to benefit the briber payer, regardless of
whether the scheme was ultimately successful. Such an allegation will
survive a motion to dismiss, 37 and the existence of circumstantial
evidence will get the case before a jury which may very well be inclined
to find that the object of the alleged scheme consisted of something more
than an effort to get a few meetings.
In fact, too much focus on the particular lesson of McDonnell could
distract practitioners from potentially more viable defenses to public
corruption cases. One practical way to analyze public corruption cases is
38
to conceptualize the quidpro quo as three legs of a stool. The quid is

the thing of value provided to the public official; the quo is the "official
action" by the public official; and the pro is the intention that one thing
was in exchange for the other. If one leg is weak, then the other two legs
will need to bear additional weight. For example, if there is little
evidence of a deal between the payer and the public official (the pro is
weak), then the prosecution will want to show that the thing of value was
a "paradigmatic" bribe and that the public official performed a clear
exercise of governmental power which benefited the payer.39 Similarly,
if there is minimal evidence that the payer provided something of value
to the public official or, for example, what he provided too closely
resembles a legal campaign contribution (the quid is weak), then the
prosecutor would be pressed to show that the public official took obvious
official action and there was a clear deal between the public official and
the payer that the public official would do this in exchange for something
from the payer.40

37. See United States v. Lee, No. 1:15CR445, 2016 WL 7336529, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 19, 2016); United States v. Jones, No. 5-15-CR-324-F-1, 2016 WL 5108013, at *5
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2016).
38. Arlo Devlin-Brown & Erin Monju, Public Corruption Prosecutions and
Defenses Post-'McDonnell', N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/id=1202777763569/Public-Corruption-Prosecutions-and-Defenses-PostMcDonnell.
39. See Skillingv. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010).
40. Compare McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1991) (requiring
an explicit quid pro quo for case involving campaign contributions), with Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that "winks and
nods" constituted mutual intent for case involving cash bribes); see also Transcript of
Jury Trial Proceedings, United States v. Ireland, No. 1:16-cr-00203-JEJ, at 4, 9 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 2017) (requiring an explicit quidpro quo in a campaign contribution case, while
acknowledging that an implicit quid pro quo would suffice for non-campaign
contribution cases).
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McDonnell's outcome fits neatly into this analysis because the
preferential access that the governor provided was not exactly morally
opprobrious and looked more like "politics as usual" (the quo was weak).
This meant that much greater weight fell on the other two legs of the
stool if the prosecution hoped to withstand challenge, and they could not
support it, at least not to the Court's satisfaction. There was no damning
testimony about a "backroom deal" between McDonnell and the
businessman, for instance, which could have compensated for the fact
that the official acts McDonnell actually provided were open to doubt.
And the fancy gifts, while distasteful, were not as paradigmatically a
bribe as cash hidden in a suitcase; indeed, under Virginia law, the gifts
arguably might not even need to be disclosed. 4 1 The weakness in the one
leg of the stool (and the lack of overwhelming strength of any other one)
was ultimately fatal to the case. What likely looked and felt like
corruption to the jury may have been too close to politics as usual (in
particular, the lawful preferential access provided to campaign donors) to
a Supreme Court wary of far-reaching statutes and increasingly
distrustful of prosecutorial discretion.
Indeed, it is McDonnell's fundamentally cynical view of the culture
of our political system that may be most significant. Read alongside the
Court's campaign finance decisions, a picture is presented of a political
reality in which money for access is normal and even an essential feature
of a political system in which donations to political campaigns are
protected speech. Against this rather dark view of what is to be expected
in a .representative democracy, the Supreme Court's unanimous
expression against criminalizing the distasteful but fundamental is
understandable.42 This signals to Congress that, if the goal is to revise
what politics as usual entails, the onus is on the legislative branch to
expand the reach of the corruption law further into the political arena.
And in the face of legislative disinterest, the onus is on the citizenry to
push for desired reforms. Ultimately, in a healthy democracy, it always
1s.

And that leads us here. At a time when trust in public officials is
empirically low and we hear slogans like "Drain the Swamp," 43 a
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3114 (West 2016) (outlining the framework and
procedures for disclosure); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3117 (West 2017) (governing disclosure
forms).
42. The Court only went so far as to acknowledge that "this case is distasteful" and
that "it may be worse than that." McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375
(2016). It concluded that it was instead concerned with "boundless interpretation of the
federal bribery statute" rather than "tawdry tales." Id.
43. Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., Trump Pledges to Drain the
Swamp and Impose Congressional Term Limits (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.donald
jtrump.com/press-releases/trump-pledges-to-drain-the-swamp.
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Symposium like this is critical to helping us understand, first, where we
are; second, where we ought go; and third, how best to get there.

